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Although the universal declaration of human rights is
often described as having been imposed from the top-
down, and based on liberal, Euro-American values, the
same cannot be said for the recognition of indigenous
rights, which is the result of social movements operating
from below.1 Land is a common focal point of these
struggles, given its central significance to the social
reproduction of indigenous communities and the pro-
tections it affords them against the pressure to assimi-
late. As the contributors to this valuable collection
attest, land rights continue to be of paramount impor-
tance to indigenous peoples, and increasingly end up
being the focus of contestation in both domestic and
international legal arenas.
The resulting legal proceedings have several distinctive
features. Although they are similar to class action cases
in that they represent a group of plaintiffs, they are
intended to protect collective rather than individual
rights. Consequently, lawyers must work closely with
indigenous communities, including their political lead-
ers and governing bodies. These relationships typically
cross cultural and linguistic boundaries. Lawyers need
to take local norms and understandings into account,
although the tools they have at their disposal for inter-
acting with plaintiffs from different cultural back-
grounds and their experience explaining legal proceed-
ings to the uninitiated stand them in good stead. How-
ever, an important dynamic of these interactions, albeit
not unique to indigenous rights claims, is that the peo-
ples they represent may regard the legal system as ille-
gitimate, given that the law was previously an instru-
ment of colonial dispossession and that the courts have a
history of favouring other interests over theirs. Lawyers
must be able to overcome these perceptions despite their
legitimacy. Working in their favour is the fact that legal
action may be the last recourse available to indigenous
peoples, apart from violence, after other forms of inter-
vention have been exhausted.2
Because of the linguistic and cultural differences
between indigenous plaintiffs (or complainants) and
members of the court, there may be significant challeng-
es associated with translation. Inevitably, the burden of
commensuration is shouldered by the indigenous plain-
tiffs and their legal representatives, who not only have
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to convey their concerns to the other participants in the
proceedings, but also have to justify why these alterna-
tive perspectives should be recognised by the court.3
One strategy of persuasion has been to incorporate
maps, which, despite their historical use as tools of dis-
possession, are increasingly appropriated by indigenous
peoples and their NGO partners as a means of repre-
senting previously unacknowledged relationships to
land and resources.4
Lawyers advocating on behalf of indigenous land rights
may also engage anthropologists who are able to render
local understandings and perspectives in terms legible to
the court.5 For example, in my own work on a case rep-
resenting the Akawaio of Isseneru village in Guyana
before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, the complainants were able to demonstrate that
local place names were toponyms in their language,
establishing historical ties to the land the state had
denied.6 But to the extent to which anthropologists may
be seen to usurp the authority of community members
to speak on their own behalf, they may find these inter-
ventions unwelcome or sidelined in favour of direct tes-
timony by indigenous community members.7 Nonethe-
less, anthropologists can help introduce novel concepts
into legal proceedings, such as the equivalence between
property rights and rights to subsistence resources in
economies that lie partially or wholly outside of the
commercial sphere, indigenous definitions of freedom as
contingent on access to the forest, or the significance of
culture loss resulting from environmental destruction.8
Despite the high stakes of these cases, defection by some
of the plaintiffs is possible, especially where there is
coercion or attempts to alienate their participation in the
legal proceedings through monetary means, whether
through bribery or compensation agreements that seek
to pre-empt the court case.9 There is also a risk that
political disagreements among the plaintiffs may derail
legal proceedings, or even prevent them from getting
started, as indigenous peoples do not always possess
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political organisation at a scale that is commensurate
with the scope of their legal claims.
Another challenge is that indigenous rights to land and
territories do not necessarily correspond with legal defi-
nitions of property ownership.10 This extends beyond
the difference between individual and collective rights.
It may include fuzzy boundaries in which people make
use of different resources from the same territory.11
Shared access can be consensual and formalised, as in
the case of a recognised commons, although overlapping
land claims can also be the result of historical strategies
of avoidance, where there is neither a need nor the abili-
ty to settle competing claims, resulting in a de facto
commons. The kinds of resource mapping discussed in
several of these papers can be an effective tool for indig-
enous communities to illustrate long-standing patterns
of land use and help challenge claims made by the state
about the appropriate use of resources.12
Another prominent feature of these cases is that they are
building blocks for the larger, developing framework of
jurisprudence that protects indigenous rights.13 This
can occur in domestic courts,14 in regional human rights
courts like the Inter-American court system and the
African Court of Human and Peoples rights,15 in inter-
national legal proceedings, and more generally in the
circulation of valuable precedents across legal forums. A
key example of this process is the gradual incorporation
of the provisions of the U.N. Declaration of the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples into judgments at all three levels
of jurisprudence.16 The hardening of soft law principles
in this process also facilitates their recognition as norms
that over time may acquire the force of international
legal standards.
There is, however, a risk that the development of inter-
national law by piggybacking on indigenous claims
occurs at the expense of the plaintiffs in these cases, or
neglects other peoples whose rights have been viola-
ted,17 by influencing the lawyers’ choice of cases, courts,
and legal strategies. This concern is magnified by the
problems of implementation that occur when particular
legal forums lack the power to enforce their judgments,
yielding paper victories that enhance recognition of
indigenous rights but do little to alter facts on the
ground. Moreover, states may respond to these deci-
sions by using strategies of foot-dragging, evasion, false
compliance, feigned ignorance, slander, and sabotage
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that are ordinarily described as ‘weapons of the weak’,18
not to mention the criminalisation of legal proceedings,
intimidation, and violence. In addition, as Maria
Sapignoli points out in her new book, Hunting Justice:
Displacement, Law, and Activism in the Kalahari, even a
successful verdict may prolong rather than conclude
interaction with the legal system.19
As several scholars have recently argued, legal activism
on behalf of indigenous peoples is more likely to result
in soft forms of political recognition than tangible forms
of redistribution.20 Nonetheless, political change is hard
won and indigenous recourse to the law may have bene-
ficial ‘unlocking effects’ that help to overcome stale-
mates in domestic arenas, ‘participation effects’ that
enhance political agency, and ‘reframing effects’ that
identify new political strategies and activate novel coali-
tions, in addition to potential ‘socioeconomic effects’
through compensation and the restitution of land.21
Legal proceedings on behalf of indigenous peoples may
also have an advantage over other legal claims, in that
the recognition of significant cultural differences
between the perspectives of the plaintiffs and the
assumptions on which the law is based may encourage
judges to think more broadly about fundamental ques-
tions, such as concerns about culture loss, the impor-
tance of maintaining access to the forest for a people’s
freedom, and the rights of people whose subsistence
practices are largely external to the commercial econo-
my. For lawyers, advocates of indigenous rights, and
indigenous peoples themselves, this means that legal
proceedings, despite their past connections to colonial
and imperial projects, may not only serve the interests
of the peoples whose rights have been infringed upon,
but also expand the law itself in ways that make these
past trespasses against and violations of indigenous
rights less likely to occur again in the future, the ulti-
mate aim of human rights initiatives.
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